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Preverbal infants engage in statistical nd probabilistic inference to learn about their 
linguistic and physical worlds. Do they also employ probabilistic information to understand their 
social world? Do they infer underlying causal mechanisms from statistical data?  Here we show, 
with looking-time methods, that 10-month-olds attend to statistical information to understand 
their social-psychological world and plausibly infer underlying causal mechanisms from 




Infants Use Statistical Sampling to Understand the Psychological World 
In recent decades a crucial advance has occurred in our understanding of childhood 
development: demonstrations that even young infants use statistical learning (e.g., Saffran et al., 
1996; Téglás, et al., 2011; Xu & Garcia, 2008) to infer the structure of language and the physical 
world. Infants also live in a social world, full of intentional agents acting in accordance with their 
goals, desires, and beliefs. To what extent is tatistical learning similarly instrumental for social 
understandings in infancy?  
To adults, overt human intentional actions manifest as unobservable causes: to fulfill  
desires, agents deliberately manipulate the overt, observable world. For example, a haphazard 
handful from the Halloween candy bowl is unlikely to pr duce our favorites, so if  someone 
deliberately chooses just five Snickers we can infer she preferred those. In contrast, selecting 
from a bowl full of Snickers gives little information for inferring a preference for Snickers over 
other candies. Thus, intentional acts that violate physical probabilities can inform us about 
psychological causes where the same act in the absence of relevant statistical information is less 
informative. 
Recent studies (Kushnir Xu & Wellman, 2010; Ma & Xu, 2011) demonstrate that 
preschoolers and toddlers use violations of physical probabilities like these to infer agents’ 
preferences. Consider Figure 1. The Minority-condition agent removes five blue balls from a box 
of 80% red ones. An observer sensitive to the relation between sample and population could 
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preference for blue balls. If the person takes five blue balls from a box of 80% blue ones, this 
largely reflects the probabilities of the underlying population and as such provides ambiguous 
information about her preference. It is intruiging that even toddlers (20-month-olds) infer a 
psychological cause—a preference for one type of object over another—from this statistical 
pattern, even when the preference differs f om their own. But by 20 months children have 
accumulated considerable information about person’s actions and desires (Repacholi & Gopnik, 
1997), including verbal information from others (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Ruffman, et al. 
2002). Conceivably, encountering and using words like “want” scaffolds children’s social-
statistical understandings. Thus, data from toddlers alone leave a theoretical gap s to the origins 
and nature of statistical learning in understanding human action, a gap that requires data from 
preverbal infants to fill.  
Previous research extensively and conclusively indicates that preverbal infants infer 
preferences from intentional actions that do not violate physical probabilities (e.g., Csibra, et al., 
1999; Phillips & Wellman, 2005; Sommerville, et al., 2005; Woodward, 1998). These studies 
typically involve a repeated presentation (to habituation) of a person reaching for one f two 
objects, and infants then look longer (show a violation of expectation) when the person later 
reaches for the previously ignored object (seemingly changing her preference or goal). It may be 
critical that two objects are visible to the agent (that the action reflects the choice of one 
alternative over another, see Luo & Baillargeon, 2005), but choosing one of two objects does not 
itself constitute a violation of physical probabilities (50/50 chance). 
Only a few recent studies have addressed whether infants connect preferences to 
violations of physical probabilities. These studies build upon prior research showing infants’ 
sensitivities to the probabilistic relations between populations and samples in th  physical world. 
For example, Xu and Garcia (2008) showed 8-month-olds a box of white and red balls, in a  80-
20 proportion. With her eyes closed, an adult rew some balls from the box. Assuming the draw 
was randomly generated, the distribution of balls in the sample should approximate the 
distribution of the balls in the box. Indeed, infants looked longer when a sample of mostly red 
balls was drawn from this box of mostly white balls. Such data indicate infants are sensitive to 
statistical relations between samples and populations but do not indicate whether infants make 
causal inferences about the events nor consider the person drawing the balls in terms of her 
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Nevertheless, a human acting on objects was central to these methods and it was 
important (at least to adults) that her eyes were closed. Indeed, in Xu and Denison (2009) if 
infants saw the experimenter draw the sample with her eyes open, 11-month-olds no longer 
expected the sample to reflect the statistical properties of the population. Specifically, if 11-
month-olds saw an agent draw a sample from a hidden box with her eyes closed (e.g., drew 5 re 
balls from the hidden box) then the infants expected the box to have almost all red balls rather 
than almost all white balls—looking longer if the box was revealed to have mostly white balls. 
However, when the agent first established that she preferred red balls (by initially drawing red 
ones from a set of three red and three white, i.e. from a 50/50 set as in he studies described 
above) and then drew the sample of red balls with her eyes open, infants looked equally if the 
hidden box was revealed to have almost all red or almost all white balls. Thu , infants’ 
expectation of statistical sampling was overridden if the sample was drawn by an eyes-open 
agent with an expressed preference.  
While these studies establish that infants can infer that agents with known preferences 
may cause violations of physical probabilities, they leave open ma y questions about whether 
and how young infants link together agents, intentions, and statistical probabilities to learn about 
the social world. Importantly, can infants also use statistical/probabilistic information to infer 
persons’ preferences? To help address these questions we asked whether infants could use 
violations of probabilities as a mechanism for learning about psychological causes uch as 
preferences. As depicted in Figure 1, we t sted 10-month-olds in a violation of expectation 
paradigm to determine whether they make the inferences that toddlers and preschoolers do from 
statistical patterns of intentional actions. 
Methods 
Seventy infants (M = 10.19 months, range 9.6-11.43) participated: 26 in the Minority 
Condition, 24 in the Majority Condition, and 20 in a Minority-Scoop condition; 63% were 
European-American, 23% bi- or mulit-racial, 6% African-American, and 8% Asian-, Pacific-
American, or other. Twenty-four additional infants did not habituate within the maximum 8 
trials; 6 others were excluded for fussiness.  
Infants saw a live actor remove 5 blue balls from a transparent box containing blue and 
red balls (see Figure 1), or saw the actor emove 5 red balls from the box (not shown in Figure 
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reporting, stimuli and conditions will be described as if each infant saw the actor remove blue 
balls from the box.  
In Minority condition habituation, a screen descended revealing a woman wearing a visor 
who looked at the box containing 5 blue and 20 red balls (20% blue). Th  woman wore a visor so 
that when her head was lowered it would occlude any further emotion she might display. The 
woman smiled, said, “Hi”, opened the box saying “Wow.” Then she removed two blue balls, 
inspected them briefly while smiling and saying “Oh blue,” and placed them in a row in front of 
her. She then removed two more blue ones i  the exact same manner, then one more, totaling 5 
blue balls. At this point she said “Look!” lowered her head, looked directly at the 5 blue balls, 
and sat like that until the infant looked away for a period of 2 consecutive seconds, or until 60 
total seconds had elapsed nding that trial.  
Majority condition habituation was identical except that the transparent box contained 20 
blue and 5 red balls (80% blue). In each habituation trial, the woman removed the blue balls in 
the same manner with e same reactions across both conditions. 
By hypothesis, if infants in the Minority condition look longer to Choose-Red (the 
opposite of the actor’s expressed preference), they are recognizing that intentional actions which 
deliberately override physical probabilities, indicate a preference. Following this reasoning, if 
infants saw a person produce the same sample (discordant with physical probabilities) but 
produced that specific sample incidentally rather than deliberately, this would not signal a 
preference. To test this implication, in a Minority-Scoop condition, we employed an action 
closely parallel to our Minority condition but where a sample of blue balls was taken incidentally 
rather than intentionally: infants saw a visored woman use a scoop to remove 5 blue balls from 
the box in one scooping action. After putting the scoop on the table the woman then took two 
blue balls from the scoop (not the box), then two more, and one final one, reacting to the balls at 
this point and lining them up on the table just as in the other two conditions. By u ing a scoop 
and not her hand and by scooping all balls at once, the Minority-Scoop actions should indicate an
incidental scoop of blue balls from the box.  
Infants in all three conditions saw multiple habituation trials until they looked 
significantly less on their last 3 trials than their first 3, or until they saw 8 habituation trials. For 
those who habituated, looking times decreased from M=22.9s for the first three habituation trials 
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and from 17.1 to 12.8 in the Minority-Scoop condition: t(25)=9.67, p<.0001; t(23)=10.86, 
p<.0001; t(19)=5.54, p<.0001, respectively. An 8-trial maximum was set because in pilot testing 
many infants fussed out of habituation if they had to sit through 10 or 12 trials of this repeated 
display. The 8-trial maximum also resulted in the 24 infants who failed to habituate noted earlier.  
After habituation infants saw one of two Test events where the screen descended 
revealing the visored woman midway between two transparent bowls, which contained either 4 
red or 4 blue balls. The woman smiled, looked at each bowl once, said “There,” and lowered her 
head to look toward and grasp a single ball in one bowl (either red or blue). Then the action froze 
until the infant looked away for 2 seconds, or 60 total seconds elapsed. Right-left position of the 
bowls was counterbalanced. For 14/26 infants in Minority, 12/24 in Majority, and 12/20 in the 
Minority-Scoop conditions the woman chose blue, for the rest she chose red. Looking times to 
these test events are shown in Figure 2.  
The looking times of 15 infants, five in each condition, were recoded from videotapes by 
a coder completely blind to infants’ test condition. Recodings were within 1s of the primary 
coder’s times for 8.2% of the trials and within 2s for 93.2%.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses howed that infants in the Choose-Blue and Choose-Red groups did 
not differ in habituation prior to their test trials. A 2 (Choose-Blue vs. Choose-Red) by (2 
Minority condition vs. Control conditions) ANOVA comparing infants on their looking times for 
their last three habituation trials combined, showed no effect of Choose-Red vs Choose-Blue 
groups, no effect of condition, and no interaction, all ps > .14. More specifically, in the Minority 
condition looking times for the Choose-Blue and Choose-Red groups did not differ: M = 8.5s 
average per trial (Choose-Blue) vs. 6.3s (Choose-R d); t(24) =1.24, p=0.23. Neither did they 
differ in the Majority condition--M = 7.9s (Choose-Blue) vs. 7.1s (Choose-R d), t(22) =0.31, 
p=0.76—or the Minority-Scoop condition--M = 9.4s (Choose-Blue) vs. 7.2s (Choose-R d), t(18) 
=0.99, p=0.34. 
For the central test event data, following our hypotheses, we expectd an interaction 
between looking times to Choose-Blue versus Choose-Red test events in the focal Minority 
condition as opposed to he two control conditions: infants should look longer to the Choose-Red 
test events (over Choose-Blue test events) in the Minority condition, but not in the Majority or 
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event looking times for infants in the Minority condition versus the two control conditions 
(Majority and Minority-Scoop) yielded the expected interaction—F(1,64)=4.66, p<0.035. We 
explored this interaction further with nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests because, as is typical in 
infant research, looking times were not normally distributed. As predicted, in the focal Minority 
(20%) condition, infants looked longer at the Choose-Red (M = 21.1s) than the Choose-Blue 
(M=13.7s) test event; Mann-Whitney test U (N=26)=47, p=.056. In the Majority (80%) 
condition, they did not; M = 13.6s (Choose-Red) vs. 16.5s (Choose-Blue), U (N=24) =64, 
p=0.67. Neither did they in the Minority-Scoop condition,  M = 12.8  (Choose-Red) vs. 17.1s 
(Choose-Blue), U (N=20) =41, p=0.62.  
Given our habituation paradigm, infants’ dishabituation to the test events provides 
complementary data about their attention and expectations. Because all the test events differed 
from habituation (the adult went from drawing balls from a single mixed box, to choosing 
between two single-color bowls of balls) some dishabituation can be expected for all test events. 
But, if during habituation in the Minority condition, infants inferred the adult had a decided 
preference for blue balls, then seeing the woman choose a red ball at test should be still further 
unexpected. Such a habitua ion-dishabituation comparison also ind vidualizes each infant’s test-
trial looking times relative to their habituation looking times. Difference scores for each infant—
the increase in looking from their last habituation trial to their test-event trial—showed that 
Minority condition infants’ increase was significantly larger when the adult chose red (M=15.0s) 
than blue (M=3.2s); U (N=26)=41, p<0.03. In contrast, in the Majority condition there was no 
difference between infants who saw the adult choose red (M=9.3s) versus blue (M=12.0); U 
(N=24)=63.5, p=0.63. Nor was there a difference in the Minority-Scoop condition; choose red 
(M=5.53s) versus blue (M=11.13), U (N=20)=34.5, p=0.31.  
Discussion 
During habituation, infants in all conditions saw very similar acts: the actor took 5 blue 
balls out of a box of red and blue ones and looked at each draw of blue balls with pleasure. 
Moreover, at test, infants in all conditions saw the exact same acts: either a grasp of a red ball 
(from its bowl) or a grasp of blue (with the women’s visor occluding any emotional reaction to 
her choice). Only two things differed between conditions: (1) the actor intentionally removed the 
blue balls from a box containing 20% (Minority condition) or 80% (Majority condition) blue 
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incidentally (Minority-Scoop). Thus, either the probability of drawing the samples was different 
(Minority vs. Majority) or the intentionality of the removal (Minority vs Minority-Scoop) was 
different. To be clear the actor’s habituation actions in all conditions were intentional in the 
overall sense of intentionally drawing balls, looking at them, and placing them in a row.  It was 
the intentionality of the sample achieved that differed critically between Minority and Minority-
Scoop conditions:  deliberately drawing five blue balls in a series of separate hand movements 
versus incidentally scooping five blue balls in one apparently haphazard scoop. 
Our interpretation is that the pattern of looking-times shows that infants in the focal 
Minority condition inferred a causal intentional state—a desire or preference—from a statistical 
pattern of action, i.e., the agent’s deliberate manipulation of the probabilities. An alternative 
interpretation that infants merely tracked a behavioral regularity—an agent hat consistently 
chooses blue balls will continue that action in test—is ruled out because in that case infants 
should show the same looking-time pattern in both Minority and Majority conditions. Yet, 
infants looked longer and dishabituated at test only in the Minority condition. A second 
alternative interpretation that infants merely reacted to population-sample differences—e.g., the 
non-random sample drawn in habituation made the color of the balls more salient in the Minority 
condition so that a subsequent choice of a red ball during test was especially note-worthy—is 
also ruled out because in that case infants should show the same looking-time pattern in the 
Minority and Minority-Scoop conditions. Yet, infants looked longer and dishabituated at test 
only in the Minority condition. Note that to behave as they did in our conditions requires infants 
go beyond understanding tha the agent is acting intentionally and that intentional actions can 
override physical statistical probabilities. It further requires using an agent’s intentional actions 
along with information from statistical sampling to infer agents’ actions and preferences. 
Two recent studies complement our findings by suggesting that infants use non-
randomness to infer the presence of agents. Ma and Xu (2011) found that given two samples that 
were equally probable, 9-month-olds expected a sequenced pattern (e.g., red-red-red-white-
white-white-red-red-red), not a seemingly random sequence, to be produced by a human hand 
but not by an inanimate claw. Similarly, Newman et al. (2010) found that 12-month-olds inferred 
the presence of an agent if a disorderly set of objects had been transformed into two neatrows. 
Our conclusion that infants use social-statistical reasoning and do so to infer 















  Infant Social Statistics - 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
9 
Xu, 2011 and Newman et al, .2010), what may be crucial to causal learning in the psychological 
domain is that intentional actions characteristically violate physical probabilities. Choosing blue 
balls from a box of mostly red ones, sorting the jumbled socks into their pairs, holding an 
unsupported spoon in midair represent everyday intentional acts and all violate mere physical 
probabilities, inertias, and assortments. We suggest that by observing agents repeatedly violating 
physical probabilities in their ntentional actions infants begin to posit unobservable causal 
psychological variables—e.g., desires or preferences. This may be a crucial process for acquiring 
psychological concepts, uch as desires, preferences, goals, and eventually beliefs, in the first 
place. 
Several researchable questions remain to confirm and explore pre-linguistic infants’ 
ability to use statistical information to infer agents’ mental states. Do, or when do, infants infer a 
general preference—e.g., that the agent would also prefer blue balls tomorrow—rather than a 
more specific desire—e.g., the agent wants blue balls for now? Do young infants have some 
prior (unlearned) notion of preferences and only use statistical information to learn about the 
particular preference of specific agents?  Or, as outlined above, are infants revealing a process 
whereby they begin to posit unobservable psychological variables (such as preferences) in the 
first place – that violations of statistical randomness strongly signal the presenc of a hidden 
causal variable (Griffiths & Tennebaum, 2007)?  
Regardless, our demonstration of social-statistical learning in 10-month-olds suggests 
such learning could be a powerful contributor to childhood development of social cognition. This 
demonstration in infancy, coupled with parallel demonstrations for toddlers and preschoolers 
(Kushnir, et al, 2010), suggests an important and extended continuity in early social cognition. In 
this way our data add to a small but growing set of studies that show that during the r first year 
infants not only reason statistically about physical and linguistic events but abo social-
psychological events as well. These findings demonstrate important commonalities between 
social, physical, and linguistic learning in infancy, thereby adding to the literature on 
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Figure 1. Schematic of experimental events. In habituation, infants saw a person draw five blue 
balls from a transparent container holding either 20% blue balls (Minority and Minority-Scoop 
Conditions) or 80% blue balls (Majority Condition). In test, infants saw the same person seated 
between two transparent bowls, one of blue and one of red balls. The person leaned and grasped 
either a blue or a red ball.  
Figure 2. Test event looking times. Data for infants in the three conditions (Minority, Majority, 
and Minority-Scoop) when they saw the target person choose either a red or a blue ball in the test 
event in the test situation where the person could freely choose. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean.  As detailed in the text, differences between the groups within a condition 
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• Sample drawn intentionally 
(Minority) or incidentally 
(Minority-Scoop) from minority 
items 
• Sample drawn intentionally from 
majority items 
Minority (20%) Conditions 
Ratio of blue to red balls: 5:20 
Majority (80%) Condition 
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Preverbal infants engage in statistical and probabilistic inference to learn about their 
linguistic and physical worlds. Do they also employ probabilistic information to understand their 
social world? Do they infer underlying causal mechanisms from statistical data?  Here we show, 
with looking-time methods, that 10-month-olds attend to statistical information to understand 
their social-psychological world and plausibly infer underlying causal mechanisms from 




Infants Use Statistical Sampling to Understand the Psychological World 
In recent decades a crucial advance has occurred in our understanding of childhood 
development: demonstrations that even young infants use statistical learning (e.g., Saffran et al., 
1996; Téglás, et al., 2011; Xu & Garcia, 2008) to infer the structure of language and the physical 
world. Infants also live in a social world, full of intentional agents acting in accordance with their 
goals, desires, and beliefs. To what extent is statistical learning similarly instrumental for social 
understandings in infancy?  
To adults, overt human intentional actions manifest as unobservable causes: to fulfill 
desires, agents deliberately manipulate the overt, observable world. For example, a haphazard 
handful from the Halloween candy bowl is unlikely to produce our favorites, so if  someone 
deliberately chooses just five Snickers we caninfer she preferred those. In contrast, selecting 
from a bowl full of Snickers gives little information for inferring a preference for Snickers over 
other candies. Thus, intentional acts that violate physical probabilities can inform us about 
psychological causes where the same act in the absence of relevant statistical information is less 
informative. 
Recent studies (Kushnir Xu & Wellman, 2010; Ma & Xu, 2011) demonstrate that 
preschoolers and toddlers use violations of physical probabilities like thes to infer agents’ 
preferences. Consider Figure 1. The Minority-condition agent removes five blue balls from a box 
of 80% red ones. An observer sensitive to the relation between sample and population could 
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preference for blue balls. If the person takes five blue balls from a box of 80% blue ones, this 
largely reflects the probabilities of the underlying population and as such provides ambiguous 
information about her preference. It is intruiging that even toddlers (20-month-olds) infer a 
psychological cause—a preference for one type of object over another—from this statistical 
pattern, even when the preference differs from their own. But by 20 months children have 
accumulated considerable information about person’s actions and desires (Repacholi & Gopnik, 
1997), including verbal information from others (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Ruffman, et al. 
2002). Conceivably, encountering and using words like “want” scaffolds children’s social-
statistical understandings. Thus, data from toddlers alone leave a theoretical gap as to the origins 
and nature of statistical learning in understanding human action, a gap that requires data from 
preverbal infants to fill.  
Previous research extensively and conclusively indicates that preverbal infants infer 
preferences from intentional actions that do not violate physical probabilities (e.g., Csibra, et al., 
1999; Phillips & Wellman, 2005; Sommerville, et al., 2005; Woodward, 1998). These studies 
typically involve a repeated presentation (to habituation) of a person reaching for one of two 
objects, and infants then look longer (show a violation of expectation) when the person later 
reaches for the previously ignored object (seemingly changing her preference or goal). It may be 
critical that two objects are visible to the agent (that the action reflects the choice of one 
alternative over another, see Luo & Baillargeon, 2005), but choosing one of two objects does not 
itself constitute a violation of physical probabilities (50/50 chance). 
Only a few recent studies have addressed whether infants connect preferences to 
violations of physical probabilities. These studies build upon prior research showing infants’ 
sensitivities to the probabilistic relations between populations and samples in the physical world. 
For example, Xu and Garcia (2008) showed 8-month-olds a box of white and red balls, in an 80-
20 proportion. With her eyes closed, an adult drew some balls from the box. Assuming the draw 
was randomly generated, the distribution of balls in the sample should approximate the 
distribution of the balls in the box. Indeed, infants looked longer when a sample of mostly red 
balls was drawn from this box of mostly white balls. Such data indicate infants are sensitive to 
statistical relations between samples and populations but do not indicate whether infants make 
causal inferences about the events nor consider the person drawing the balls in terms of her 
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Nevertheless, a human acting on objects was central to these methods and it was 
important (at least to adults) that her eyes were closed. Indeed, in Xu and Denison (2009) if 
infants saw the experimenter draw the sample with her eyes open, 11-month-olds no longer 
expected the sample to reflect the statistical properties of the population. Specifically, if 11-
month-olds saw an agent draw a sample from a hidden box with her eyes closed (e.g., drew 5 red 
balls from the hidden box) then the infants expected the box to have almost all red balls rather 
than almost all white balls—looking longer if the box was revealed to have mostly white balls. 
However, when the agent first established that she preferred red balls (by initially drawing red 
ones from a set of three red and three white, i.e. from a 50/50 set as in the studies described 
above) and then drew the sample of red balls with her eyes open, infants looked equally if the 
hidden box was revealed to have almost all red or almost all white balls. Thu , infants’ 
expectation of statistical sampling was overridden if the sample was drawn by an eyes-open 
agent with an expressed preference.  
While these studies establish that infants can infer that agents with known preferences 
may cause violations of physical probabilities, they leave open many questions about whether 
and how young infants link together agents, intentions, and statistical probabilities to learn about 
the social world. Importantly, can infants also use statistical/probabilistic information to infer 
persons’ preferences? To help address these questions we asked whether infants could use 
violations of probabilities as a mechanism for learning about psychological causes such as 
preferences. As depicted in Figure 1, we tested 10-month-olds in a violation of expectation 
paradigm to determine whether they make the inferences that toddlers and preschoolers do from 
statistical patterns of intentional actions. 
Methods 
Seventy infants (M = 10.19 months, range 9.6-11.43) participated: 26 in the Minority 
Condition, 24 in the Majority Condition, and 20 in a Minority-Scoop condition; 63% were 
European-American, 23% bi- or mulit-racial, 6% African-American, and 8% Asian-, Pacific-
American, or other. Twenty-four additional infants did not habituate within the maximum 8 
trials; 6 others were excluded for fussiness.  
Infants saw a live actor remove 5 blue balls from a transparent box containing blue and 
red balls (see Figure 1), or saw the actor remove 5 red balls from the box (not shown in Figure 
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reporting, stimuli and conditions will be described as if each infant saw the actor remove blue 
balls from the box.  
In Minority condition habituation, a screen descended revealing a woman wearing a visor 
who looked at the box containing 5 blue and 20 red balls (20% blue). The woman wore a visor so 
that when her head was lowered it would occlude any further emotion she might display. The 
woman smiled, said, “Hi”, opened the box saying “Wow.” Then she removed two blue balls, 
inspected them briefly while smiling and saying “Oh blue,” and placed them in a row in front of 
her. She then removed two more blue ones in the exact same manner, then one more, totaling 5 
blue balls. At this point she said “Look!” lowered her head, looked directly at the 5 blue balls, 
and sat like that until the infant looked away for a period of 2 consecutive seconds, or until 60 
total seconds had elapsed ending that trial.  
Majority condition habituation was identical except that the transparent box contained 20 
blue and 5 red balls (80% blue). In each habituation trial, the woman removed the blue balls in 
the same manner with the same reactions across both conditions. 
By hypothesis, if infants in the Minority condition look longer to Choose-Red (the 
opposite of the actor’s expressed preference), they are recognizing that intentional actions which 
deliberately override physical probabilities, indicate a preference. Following this reasoning, if 
infants saw a person produce the same sample (discordant with physical probabilities) but 
produced that specific sample incidentally rather than deliberately, this would not signal a 
preference. To test this implication, in a Minority-Scoop condition, we employed an action 
closely parallel to our Minority condition but where a sample of blue balls was taken incidentally 
rather than intentionally: infants saw a visored woman use a scoop to remove 5 blue balls from 
the box in one scooping action. After putting the scoop on the table the woman then took two 
blue balls from the scoop (not the box), then two more, and one final one, reacting to the balls at 
this point and lining them up on the table just as in the other two conditions. By using a scoop 
and not her hand and by scooping all balls at once, the Minority-Scoop actions should indicate an 
incidental scoop of blue balls from the box.  
Infants in all three conditions saw multiple habituation trials until they looked 
significantly less on their last 3 trials than their first 3, or until they saw 8 habituation trials. For 
those who habituated, looking times decreased from M=22.9s for the first three habituation trials 
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and from 17.1 to 12.8 in the Minority-Scoop condition: t(25)=9.67, p<.0001; t(23)=10.86, 
p<.0001; t(19)=5.54, p<.0001, respectively. An 8-trial maximum was et because in pilot testing 
many infants fussed out of habituation if they had to sit through 10 or 12 trials of this repeated 
display. The 8-trial maximum also resulted in the 24 infants who failed to habituate noted earlier.  
After habituation infants saw one of two Test events where the screen descended 
revealing the visored woman midway between two transparent bowls, which contained either 4 
red or 4 blue balls. The woman smiled, looked at each bowl once, said “There,” and lowered her 
head to look toward and grasp a single ball in one bowl (either red or blue). Then the action froze 
until the infant looked away for 2 seconds, or 60 total seconds elapsed. Right-left position of the 
bowls was counterbalanced. For 14/26 infants in Minority, 12/24 in Majority, and 12/20 in the 
Minority-Scoop conditions the woman chose blue, for the rest she chose red. Looking times to 
these test events are shown in Figure 2.  
The looking times of 15 infants, five in each condition, were recoded from videotapes by 
a coder completely blind to infants’ test condition. Recodings were within 1s of the primary 
coder’s times for 88.2% of the trials and within 2s for 93.2%.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses showed that infants in the Choose-Blue and Choose-Red groups did 
not differ in habituation prior to their test trials. A 2 (Choose-Blue vs. Choose-Red) by (2 
Minority condition vs. Control conditions) ANOVA comparing infants on their looking times for 
their last three habituation trials combined, showed no effect of Choose-Red vs Choose-Blue 
groups, no effect of condition, and no interaction, all ps > .14. More specifically, in the Minority 
condition looking times for the Choose-Blue and Choose-Red groups did not differ: M = 8.5s 
average per trial (Choose-Blue) vs. 6.3s (Choose-Red); t(24) =1.24, p=0.23. Neither did they 
differ in the Majority condition--M = 7.9s (Choose-Blue) vs. 7.1s (Choose-Red), t(22) =0.31, 
p=0.76—or the Minority-Scoop condition--M = 9.4s (Choose-Blue) vs. 7.2s (Choose-Red), t(18) 
=0.99, p=0.34. 
For the central test event data, following our hypotheses, we expectd an interaction 
between looking times to Choose-Blue versus Choose-Red test events in the focal Minority 
condition as opposed to the two control conditions: infants should look longer to the Choose-Red 
test events (over Choose-Blue test events) in the Minority condition, but not in the Majority or 
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event looking times for infants in the Minority condition versus the two control conditions 
(Majority and Minority-Scoop) yielded the expected interaction—F(1,64)=4.66, p<0.035. We 
explored this interaction further with nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests because, as is typical in 
infant research, looking times were not normally distributed. As predicted, in the focal Minority 
(20%) condition, infants looked longer at the Choose-Red (M = 21.1s) than the Choose-Blue 
(M=13.7s) test event; Mann-Whitney test U (N=26)=47, p=.056. In the Majority (80%) 
condition, they did not; M = 13.6s (Choose-Red) vs. 16.5s (Choose-Blue), U (N=24) =64, 
p=0.67. Neither did they in the Minority-Scoop condition,  M = 12.8  (Choose-Red) vs. 17.1s 
(Choose-Blue), U (N=20) =41, p=0.62.  
Given our habituation paradigm, infants’ dishabituation to the test events provides 
complementary data about their attention and expectations. Because all the test events differed 
from habituation (the adult went from drawing balls from a single mixed box, to choosing 
between two single-color bowls of balls) some dishabituation can be expected for all test events. 
But, if during habituation in the Minority condition, infants inferred the adult had a decided 
preference for blue balls, then seeing the woman choose a red ball at test should be still further 
unexpected. Such a habituation-dishabituation comparison also individualizes each infant’s test-
trial looking times relative to their habituation looking times. Difference scores for each infant—
the increase in looking from their last habituation trial to their test-event trial—showed that 
Minority condition infants’ increase was significantly larger when the adult chose red (M=15.0s) 
than blue (M=3.2s); U (N=26)=41, p<0.03. In contrast, in the Majority condition there was no 
difference between infants who saw the adult choose red (M=9.3s) versus blue (M=12.0); U 
(N=24)=63.5, p=0.63. Nor was there a difference in the Minority-Scoop condition; choose red 
(M=5.53s) versus blue (M=11.13), U (N=20)=34.5, p=0.31.  
Discussion 
During habituation, infants in all conditions saw very similar acts: the actor took 5 blue 
balls out of a box of red and blue ones and looked at each draw of blue balls with pleasure. 
Moreover, at test, infants in all conditions saw the exact same acts: either a grasp of a red ball 
(from its bowl) or a grasp of blue (with the women’s visor occluding any emotional reaction to 
her choice). Only two things differed between conditions: (1) the actor intentionally removed the 
blue balls from a box containing 20% (Minority condition) or 80% (Majority condition) blue 
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incidentally (Minority-Scoop). Thus, either the probability of drawing the samples was different 
(Minority vs. Majority) or the intentionality of the removal (Minority vs Minority-Scoop) was 
different. To be clear the actor’s habituation actions in all conditions were intentional in the 
overall sense of intentionally drawing balls, looking at them, and placing them in a row.  It was 
the intentionality of the sample achieved that differed critically between Minority and Minority-
Scoop conditions:  deliberately drawing five blue balls in a series of separate hand movements 
versus incidentally scooping five blue balls in one apparently haphazard scoop. 
Our interpretation is that the pattern of looking-times shows that infants in the focal 
Minority condition inferred a causal intentional state—a desire or preference—from a statistical 
pattern of action, i.e., the agent’s deliberate manipulation of the probabilities. An alternative 
interpretation that infants merely tracked a behavioral regularity—an agent that consistently 
chooses blue balls will continue that action in test—i  ruled out because in that case infants 
should show the same looking-time pattern in both Minority and Majority conditions. Yet, 
infants looked longer and dishabituated at test only in the Minority condition. A second 
alternative interpretation that infants merely reacted to population-sample differences—e.g., the 
non-random sample drawn in habituation made the color of the balls more salient in the Minority 
condition so that a subsequent choice of a red ball during test was especially note-worthy—is 
also ruled out because in that case infants should show the same looking-time pattern in the 
Minority and Minority-Scoop conditions. Yet, infants looked longer and dishabituated at test 
only in the Minority condition. Note that to behave as they did in our conditions requires infants 
go beyond understanding that the agent is acting intentionally and that intentional actions can 
override physical statistical probabilities. It further requires using an agent’s intentional actions 
along with information from statistical sampling to infer agents’ actions and preferences. 
Two recent studies complement our findings by suggesting that infants use non-
randomness to infer the presence of agents. Ma and Xu (2011) found that given two samples that 
were equally probable, 9-month-olds expected a sequenced pattern (e.g., red-red-red-white-
white-white-red-red-red), not a seemingly random sequence, to be produced by a human hand 
but not by an inanimate claw. Similarly, Newman et al. (2010) found that 12-month-olds inferred 
the presence of an agent if a disorderly set of objects had been transformed into two neat rows. 
Our conclusion that infants use social-statistical reasoning and do so to infer 
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Xu, 2011 and Newman et al, .2010), what may be crucial to causal learning in the psychological 
domain is that intentional actions characteristically violate physical probabilities. Choosing blue 
balls from a box of mostly red ones, sorting the jumbled socks into their pairs, holding an 
unsupported spoon in midair represent everyday intentional acts and all violate mere physical 
probabilities, inertias, and assortments. We suggest that by observing agents repeatedly violating 
physical probabilities in their intentional actions infants begin to posit unobservable causal 
psychological variables—e.g., desires or preferences. This may be a crucial process for acquiring 
psychological concepts, such as desires, preferences, goals, and eventually beliefs, in the first 
place. 
Several researchable questions remain to confirm and explore pre-linguistic infants’ 
ability to use statistical information to infer agents’ mental states. Do, or when do, infants infer a 
general preference—e.g., that the agent would also prefer blue balls tomorrow—rather than a 
more specific desire—e.g., the agent wants blue balls for now? Do young infants have some 
prior (unlearned) notion of preferences and only use statistical information to learn about the 
particular preference of specific agents?  Or, as outlined above, are infants revealing a process 
whereby they begin to posit unobservable psychological variables (such as preferences) in the 
first place – that violations of statistical randomness strongly signal the presence of a hidden 
causal variable (Griffiths & Tennebaum, 2007)?  
Regardless, our demonstration of social-statistical learning in 10-month-olds suggests 
such learning could be a powerful contributor to childhood development of social cognition. This 
demonstration in infancy, coupled with parallel demonstrations for toddlers and preschoolers 
(Kushnir, et al, 2010), suggests an important and extended continuity in early social cognition. In 
this way our data add to a small but growing set of studies that show that during their first year 
infants not only reason statistically about physical and linguistic events but about social-
psychological events as well. These findings demonstrate important commonalities between 
social, physical, and linguistic learning in infancy, thereby adding to the literature on 
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Figure 1. Schematic of experimental events. In habituation, infants saw a person draw five blue 
balls from a transparent container holding either 20% blue balls (Minority and Minority-Scoop 
Conditions) or 80% blue balls (Majority Condition). In test, infants saw the same person seated 
between two transparent bowls, one of blue and one of red balls. The person leaned and grasped 
either a blue or a red ball.  
Figure 2. Test event looking times. Data for infants in the three conditions (Minority, Majority, 
and Minority-Scoop) when they saw the target person choose either a red or a blue ball in the test 
event in the test situation where the person could freely choose. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean.  As detailed in the text, differences between the groups within a condition 
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 Sample drawn intentionally 
(Minority) or incidentally 
(Minority-Scoop) from minority 
items 
 Sample drawn intentionally from 
majority items 
Minority (20%) Conditions 
Ratio of blue to red balls: 5:20 
Majority (80%) Condition 
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